ABSTRACT
Nigeria had overwhelmingly given both solicited and
unsolicited supports to African neigbours: intervened positively in their
internal crisis, provided humanitarian services, doled out billions of dollars
as charity, sent technical aid corps, formed and sent military supports, and so
on. In most cases, these flamboyant gestures were defiantly done against home
interest and survival. However, there seems to be a disconnection
between what is given out and what is given in return. Therefore, this paper
seeks to comparatively analyse the Afro-centive foreign policy of Nigeria; a
case study of Obansanjo Administration and Nigeria’s International Diplomacy.The
qualitative mechanism of data collection and analysis is applied and the
hypothesis was assessed based on the following interventions;Actors in
Nigeria’s Foreign Policy, the African-centered foreign policy of the Nigerian government,
an Overview Of Nigerian Foreign Policy (1999-2007) and Political Environment Of Nigeria’s
Foreign Policy.
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
of the Study
A country's foreign policy consists of
self-interest strategies chosen by the state to safeguard its national
interests and to achieve its goals within the international relations
milieu. It is the
aggregate of a country’s national interest which results from the interaction
of internal and external forces as perceived by the foreign policy decision
makers. The approaches used are strategically employed to
interact with other countries. In recent times however, due to the deepening
level of globalization and transnational activities, relations and interactions
have been known to exist between state and non- state actors in the
international political arena. These relations in their own way have influenced
several foreign policies between nation states.
Nigeria’s
foreign policy since independence has been viewed from different perspectives (Aluko,
1981); Macridis
(1985:xiii),Anyaele, (2005) in recent times. One of the most prevailing perspectives of her foreign policy
is that “it is chameleon in nature”, (Anyaele, 2005) a foreign policy constantly in a state of flux as a
result of internal and external dynamics inherent in any given administration
or regime. Some writers however maintained that irrespective
of the frequent changes, the substance of Nigeria’s foreign policy has remained
the same. The later parts of this study will however argue otherwise.
Buttressing the above point, (Anyaele, 2005:2) upholds the view that “the
protection of our national interest has remained the permanent focus of
Nigeria’s foreign policy, but the strategies for such protection have varied
from one regime / government to another”.
The formation and execution of Nigeria’s foreign
policy from independence has been carried out in no fewer than fourteen
different administrations through the external affairs ministry. From Tafawa
Balewa’s administration in 1960 to President Obasanjo’s administration in 2003;
from the administration of President Musa Yar’Adua to the current
administration of President Goodluck Jonathan. These various administrations -
including the different military regimes which took over administrative power
in Nigeria for over a cumulative period of 35 years, of the entire 53 years of
the existence of Nigeria’s foreign policy- claimed to pursue the same national
interest with regards to the nation’s foreign policy.
The consequence of the fluxy nature of Nigeria’s
foreign policy, there has been a plethora of
conceptual ideological transitions in Nigeria’s foreign policy machinery (Pine, 2011). Studies (Aluko, 1981); (Vision 2020 Report,
2009); (Pine, 2011); (Akinboye, 2013); and indicate
that past administrations strove towards an epistemological construction and
definition of the thrust of Nigeria’s foreign policy. These conceptualizations
are often regime specific and born out of a psychological and selfish hunger of
various administrations or regimes to carve an identity which will leave a
lasting impression in the minds of Nigerians. To this end, (Pin, 2011) laments:
“...these ideologies are not necessarily products of deep and profound
philosophical reflections”. This paper will argue that these ideologies are
rather collections of selfish efforts by these various administrations to make
a name or an identity for themselves and their regime or administration as the
case may be. (Pin, 2011:1) strongly believes this factor was one of the major
causative avenues / agencies of project abandonment and foreign policy failure
in Nigeria. Concepts and ideologies that have been proposed over the years
since independence include: Africa as the center piece of Nigeria’s foreign
policy, Dynamic foreign policy, National consensus in foreign policy, Economic
diplomacy, Citizen Diplomacy and The
transformation agenda of Nigeria’s foreign policy are a few examples among many
other ideologies which in many ways have not lived up to expectations.
While adopting the traditional critical and
rationalist methods of analysis in philosophy, the study shall review and offer
conceptual clarifications of
relevant literature, arguments, texts, library and archival materials in the
areas of the subject matter of the study, with the view to evaluate these conceptual mutations in Nigeria’s foreign policy
engineering. The paper will further show
how such misdirected polices breads operationally barren and philosophically
vague policies which when applied resulted to more conceptual confusion and
groping in the dark.
1.2 Statement
of Problem
The main concern of Nigeria’s policy makers is
how to emancipate Africa from the shackles of colonialism, apartheid, racismand
imperialism. It is therefore not surprising that Nigeria focused its policy
since independence on Africa.
In spite of
this African policy posture, some people criticized Mohammed/Obansanjo regime
as shrouded with uncertainties in relation to her African policy as fallen
short of expectation considering its economic resources, others, hailed it has
been dynamic and pragmatic because of its militancy. On the other hand,
Babangida’s Afro centric policy style is a far departure from that of Obasanjo.
It is in
light of the above observations that this study intends to find out the reason(s)
for the policy shift despite the fact that both regimes pursue the same
African-centred policy. To effectively do this, the following questions are posed
1.3 Research
Questions
The following research
questions were formulated to guide the study:
1.
What
are the approaches adopted by both Babangida and Obasanjo in their separate
pursuit of Nigeria Afro-centric foreign policy?
2.
Does
contemporary African situations promote Afro-centric foreign policy?
3.
To
what extent does personality of a regime leader affect a country’s policy?
1.4 Research Hypotheses
1
The
approach of both Babangida and Obasanjo in the pursuit of Nigerian Afrocentric
foreign policy were the same.
1.
The
contemporary African situation differs from what it was during the era of
Nigerian adoption of afrocentric foreign policy.
2.
Babangida
and Obasanjo though pursued the same foreign document, their personality
difference affected the policy implementation and outcome.
1.5 Objectives
of the Study
The general objective is to comparatively analyse the Afro-centive
foreign policy of Nigeria; a case study of Obansanjo civil regime and
Babangida.
The
specific objectives include
1.
To
compare Babangida’s and Obansanjo’s approach to implementation of Afrocentricforeignpolicy.
2.
To
assess the contemporary African situations for possible review of Nigerian
Afrocentric foreign policy.
3.
To
evaluate the impact of personality (character) of a regime leader on Nigerian
foreign policy using Babangida and Obansanjo as a study.
1.6 Significance
of the Study
This study
will aid researchers in understanding the contributions of Nigerian’s past
presidents on the foreign policies that has impacted on the development of
Africa, irrespective of the situations in the country.This study will equally
serve as a repository in understanding the various roles thatour country’s past
presidents played in improving national development in Nigeria.
Finally, politicians,
stakeholders and future political aspirants intending to rule in various
sectors of the government would be able to utilize the findings in this study as
a guide and resource document, taking into consideration the impact of the
foreign policy on the administration and the importance of making Africa a
focal point of her foreign policy.
1.7 Scope
and limitations of the study
1.7.1 Scope.
The scope of this study focuses on the Afro-centric foreign policy of
Nigeria during the Obasanjo’s Civil Regime and Babangida’s Administration with
the following it compares the contemporary afro centric situations and those of
the two regimes.
1.7.2 Limitations.
Financial
resources required in obtaining primary data are often on the high side
considering the amount required in producing the questionnaires required for
the study. Also considering the combination of both my studies and the project,
time was not adequate for a more elaborate study.
1.8 Theoretical Framework
This study
is largely based on the theory of state relative autonomy theory, which is
situated within the ambit of the neo-Marxist political economy paradigm. The
theory of relative state autonomy depicts the degree of aloofness of the state
in the discharge of its tasks such as mediating inter-class and intraclass
struggles. Thus, this theory suggests that in any state, there are two levels
of contradiction, primary and secondary. Primary contradiction depicts
inter-class struggle or class struggle between two antagonistic classes such as
the ruling class and the ruled class or the bourgeois class and the
proletariat. Whereas, secondary contradiction is the intra-class struggle,
denoting class conflicts within the rulingclass or between different segments
of the ruling-class. Marx and Engels (1977) demonstrated this intractable
nature of class struggle in the preface of their book, that “the history of all
the hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles” (Okeke and
Aniche, 2012b).
The
proponents and exponents of the theory hold that a state can exhibit either low
or high relative autonomy (Alavi, 1972). A state exhibits relatively high
autonomy when there is high commoditization of capital or excessive penetration
of capital into the economy; such that the bourgeois class engages in
accumulation of capital through direct exploitation of the working class or
appropriation of surplus value, private capitalism, when they enter into social
relationships of production. Here, the state is not interventionist; it does
not intervene in the domestic economy like participating in the productive
activities, public/state enterprises or controlling or nationalizing means of
production. The role of state here is largely to regulate (Ake, 1976). By doing
so, the state is relatively an impartial umpire mediating inter-class and
intra-class struggles through harmonization and reconciliation of class
interests (Ake, 1981; Okafor et al. 2012; Okeke and Aniche, 2012b). The
developed capitalist states of the West are, therefore, considered to exemplify
this high degree of relative autonomy, and thus the high level of human rights
observance and protection. On the other hand, a state exhibits relatively low
autonomy when there is low commodification of capital or low penetration of
(private) capital into the economy. The ruling class is constantly indulging in
primitive accumulation of capital through embezzlement of public fund. A state
constituted in this way becomes the only avenue for capital accumulation. The
state is, thus, interventionist for engaging in productive activities, public
corporation, by nationalization of major means of production. This state does
not restrict itself to regulatory role and is hence compromised, such that
instead of rising above class struggle it is deeply immersed in it (Ake, 1985;
Okafor et al., 2012; Okeke and Aniche, 2012b).
The
Nigerian state like other developing states exhibits a relatively low level of
autonomy of the state as a result of low commoditisation of capital. Under the
eclectic mixture of economy, pseudocapitalism or quasi-capitalism, Nigeria
experiences the phenomenon of poor penetration of (private) capital into the
economy. This gives rise to a parasitic petty bourgeois class whose major
source of accumulation of capital is the state. So, the Nigerian state becomes
the only avenue for primitive accumulation of capital through which the
governing class. petty bourgeoisie, produces and reproduces their dominance.
The implication of the low autonomy of the Nigerian state is that it is heavily
involved in the class struggle rather than rising above it; leading to intense
struggle for the control of the state for primitive accumulation of capital
(Ake, 2001; Okeke and Aniche, 2012b). The point is that the implementation of
citizen diplomacy suffered as President Yar’Adua’s ill-health degenerated.
Consequently, there was political intrigue, infighting and schism among the
ministers, and the Northern political elite who wanted by all means to prevent
the vice president from becoming the acting president. In the context of this
intense class struggle for the state power everything was marginalized
including citizens’ wellbeing at home let alone in Diaspora. Not surprisingly,
the policy was deemphasized owing to the events leading to the emergence of the
then Vice President, Goodluck Jonathan as the Acting President and later
President. The cabinet reshuffled ousted Chief Ojo Maduekwe (the initiator) as
the Minister of Foreign Affairs.
1.9
Literature Review
1.9.1
An Overview of Nigerian Foreign Policy
(1960-2011)
Nigerian foreign policy soon
after independence in 1960 under Balewa’s Administration (1960-1966) was anchored
on: one, Africa, the centre-piece of Nigerian foreign policy; two, the policy of
pan Africanism;three, the policy of decolonization and eradication of
racial discrimination and segregation; four, the policy of good neighborliness;
five, the policy of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other countries;
and finally, the policy of non-alignment. However, the mostenduring foreign
policy thrust in Nigeria has been the Afro-centric philosophy of Nigerian foreign
policy in which Nigeria spent enormous resources in assisting other African
countries like Namibia, Angola,Zimbabwe, Mozambique, etc, under colonial
domination to gain independence. Under the African centeredness of Nigerian
foreign policy, Nigeria also assisted in the antiapartheid struggle in South
Africa. It also contributed in peacekeeping forces in crisis regions in Africa
such as Chad, Niger,Liberia, Sierra Leone, Cote d’Ivoire, Sudan,Darfur,
Somalia, Democratic Republic of Congo, etc (Aniche, 2009).
Still under
this policy thrust, Nigeria assisted other African countries financially and
technically in their economy. Although,the foreign policy posture has been
seriously challenged or criticized by scholars and practitioners alike. It was
not until recentlythat Nigeria started rescinding and reviewing its foreign policy
in line with the foreign policy reform panel set up by Yar’Adua’s Administration
in 2007, soon after assuming office. The product of this policy reform is citizen
diplomacy. Other foreign policy thrusts like policy of decolonization,
eradication of racial discrimination and segregation, nonintervention and
non-alignment naturally fizzled out with time. For example, policies of
decolonization in Africa, and racial discrimination and segregation
naturally waned with the achievement of independence and sovereignty in all
African territories and elimination of Apartheid policy in South Africa. Due to
United Nations’ (UN) and African Union’s (AU)responsibility to intervene on
humanitarian grounds in the crisis regions, the policy of non-intervention is
falling into disuse.Policy of non-alignment became obsolete with the events of
late 1980s and early 1990s leading to the end of cold war and the beginning of
post-cold war era Aniche,2009).
Under
Gowon’s Regime (1966-1975) the policy of African centeredness was utilized and
geared towards regional integration in West Africa leading to the establishment
of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Whilst,
under Murtala/Obasanjo’s Regime and Shagari’s Administration Nigeria continued
with the policy of African centeredness assisting many African countries and
contributing inthe National War of Liberation in some of African territories
under colonial rule andanti-apartheid struggle in South Africa(Aniche, 2009).
During Babangida’s Regime
(1985-1993), anew lexicon found its way into Nigerian foreign policy, the policy
of economic diplomacy. The policy of economic diplomacy was aimed at achieving
economic recovery and development through the collaboration of Breton Woods
Institutions(BWIs), under conditionality of which,Nigeria undertook to
implement Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) between 1986 and 1990. The policy
of is another enduring foreign policy thrust of Nigeria
foreign policy. Thus,under Obasanjo’s Civilian Administration(1999-2007),
Nigeria revisited the policy of economic diplomacy aimed at receiving debt relief
and attracting foreign directinvestment (FDI) through the instrumentalities of
the Breton Woods institutions (BWIs). Nigeria agreed to implement the World Bank
and International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan conditionality as encapsulated in the
National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy(NEEDS) (Aniche, 2010;
Okeke and Aniche,2012a).
Citizen
diplomacy is a foreign policy thrust of Yar’Adua’s Administration under which the
Federal Government of Nigeria seeks the assistance of Nigerians at home and
in Diaspora in its effort to develop the country economically and politically.
For being people-oriented, it is a part of the broad range of Nigerian foreign
policy that promotes the aspects that look into the welfare of Nigeria’s citizens
and seeks to defend them wherever they are (Dickson,2010).
1.9.2
Political Environment of Nigeria’s
Foreign Policy
Linkage
politics approach assumes that domestic politics and foreign policy
are organically interconnected and that the totality of the domestic structure
determines or conditions the character of Nigeria’s foreign policy. In other
words, the internal political environment shapes the outcomes of Nigeria’s
foreign policy making. As a result the conceptualization of Nigeria’s external or
foreign relations in a linkage system presupposes that Nigeria’s foreign policy
is a product of the domestic structure.The underlying argument here is that
the international environment influences. Domestic politics just as domestic
political environment shapes international events.Thus, foreign policy is
conceived as the outcome or product of the dynamic interplay between the internal
and external political environments of nation-states (Idang, 1973;Philips, 1973;
Akinyemi, 1974; Asobie,1980; Gambari, 1980; Aluko, 1981; Nweke,1986;
Ifesinachi, 2001).
Furthermore,
the linkage politics approach to foreign policy holds that there is a link
or nexus between domestic political structure and external relation or foreign
policy. Thus,domestic factors like religion, culture,economy, etc. are seen as
considerable significance to foreign policy making. The idea of a linkage or
interface between the domestic political structure and external political
environment allows for an analysis that adequately examines the extent to
which interaction between the two can constitute ahindrance to the formulation
of effective foreign policy thrusts such as citizen diplomacy. As a result, the
linkage approach provides a specific context for identifying the extent to which
specific forces canpositively or negatively impinge upon the achievement or
accomplishment of a given foreign policy objective such as citizen diplomacy
(Holsi, 1967; Rosenau, 1969;Northege, 1968; Nweke, 1988; Birai, 1991;Dauda,
2002).
Perhaps,
the import of the above is that foreign policy is basically a product ofcomplex
and diversifying interrelationship of external and internal circumstances
and stimuli. Hence, the actions of a nation-states determined or influenced by
both domestic and external variables, and as such,foreign policy becomes the
continuation or the extension of domestic policy (Idang,1973; Akinyemi, 1974;
Nweke, 1985;Ogunsawo, 1986; Offiong, 2000; Okolie,2001). The point is that
there is a link between internal or domestic politics and external or
international politics known as linkage politics. The underlying idea of linkage
politics is that the link between the internal political environment
influences foreign policy making and implementation of states, Nigeria included.
The Nigerian internal or domestic political environment is one where political
class engaged inelectoral malpractices in form of electoral rigging and
violence. Under this state of affairs, Nigerian citizens are confronted with
abject poverty, mass unemployment, poor standards of living,low life expectancy,
low literacy rate, etc. In the human development index.
The
Nigerian state is not forthcoming at catering for the welfare and wellbeing of
its citizens in Nigeria, forcing many Nigerians to seek greener pastures abroad
or to put more aptly, economic refuge abroad. As a result many of them are
engaged in many illegal activities to survive harsh treatment abroad where they
are not likely to get a decent job. Even the corruption perception index (CPI)
of the Transparency International (TI) has not ranked Nigeria favorably since
its inception.
For
instance, Adejumo (2011) notes that with several corrupt former Governors
still parading themselves imperiously on the streets of Abuja, still on the beck
and call of the president, and appeared seemingly untouchable; it will be hard to
convince the world that we are still waging war against corruption in earnest and
with sincerity of purpose. Successive Nigerian governments have nothing to be
proud of in terms of promoting positive image of Nigeria or tackling corruption.
In fact, whatever little policy was made had only been there to benefit those in
the government and not the Nigerian masses.
Also, the
thinness of socio-economic capitalist based on community repeated premises that
Nigeria has some of the worst social indicators in the world: internal
insecurity, a deteriorating infrastructural base, corruption,high crime,
unbridled violence; ethnic conflict; a disorganized and moribund labour sector, a
poor external image crisis exacerbated by a world-wide reputation for astuteness
in financial and other related crimes represent some of these problems.
In addition to this, is the high mortality, whereas majority of the population
ostensibly living below poverty line in a country where the life expectancy is at
zero point, and you get a country with a supposedly fragile base and foundation
upon which such a policy can be founded (Eke, 2009).
Adejumo
(2011) further opines that for the citizen diplomacy to succeed, it must
be backed up with the sincere purpose and approach to Nigeria’s entire problem
at home. After fifty years as a sovereign state, and with enormous resources
both human and material, Nigerians are still wallowingin abject poverty and
desperation, while our leaders are looting the treasures all over the country and
living unimaginable expensive lifestyles, and depositing the loots in countries
we are trying to force the citizen diplomacy on.
1.9.3
Conceptualizing the Domestic Structure of
Nigerian Foreign Policy
It has
become an axiomatic truth that the FP of a country is to a large extent
determined by its Domestic Structure. Many scholars and diplomats have accepted
this view. They have attempted to“demonstrate that the various constituent
elements in the political system- the government, the political parties,
pressure groups, the civil service, the political and bureaucratic elites,
public opinion, and the press- operating within the democratic process provided
by the constitution,exert direct or indirect influence in shaping a country’s Foreign
Policy ( Nweke, 1986:34 ). It is line withthis assertion that Akokpari
(1999:24) has argued that Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) countries have to constantly
reorient their foreign policies to reflect or accommodate domestic and external
vicissitudes. Such orientation shifts have rendered SSA’s foreign policies
innately malleable and pliable, deprived of coherence or consistence. Since the
independence decade of the 1960s, shifts in the orientation of foreign policies
of SSA states have been profoundly evident.
A lot
scholars and diplomats have attempted an in-depth assessment of Nigeria’s foreign
policy. Idang, Akinyemi, Gambari and Aluko perspectives in analyzing Nigerian FP
focused exclusively on limited goals. Idang (1986) focused on the impacts of
institutions and social forces, like parliament, political parties and Foreign Policy
elites. Akinyemi on the other hand conducteda dissectional examination of the
nature and character of the administrative structure in the FP process when
subjected to other “pressures” of DS, particularly political parties and
attitudes of political elites (1970:2). Gambari has also argued that the
domestic political structure and process are of great impact on the nature and
character of Nigerian FP because they serve as the channel for internalization
of the international environment and events, thus making them intelligible and
of value to the participants in domestic political roles (1980:1). Aluko
(1976)on his part embarked on the imperative to resolve the impact of colonial
heritage and the formative experience of the leadership. Other studies have
focused on the evolution of Nigerian FP by demonstrating how “internal
pressures” both of administrative structure and of the society as well as how
organizations really affect FP formulation (Philips, 1973). Inspite of all
these intellectual exercises in clarifying the link between the DS and FP,
Nweke(1986:35) has pointed out that a thread that runs through all of these
studies is there shortcomings. One of them was the issue of preference given to
institutional forces with lessconsideration given to the impacts of
socio-economic structure and social classes. Another main weakness is their
failure to analyze “beyond the levels of description and explanation”.
1.9.4 Domestic Environment
Conventional
thinking holds that foreign policies aim at enhancing a state’s ability to
achieve a specific FP is “a programme (plan) designed to address some problems
or pursue some goal that entails action towards foreign entities. A country’s FP
is determined by two broad considerations: the domestic and the external
environment. According to Otubanjo (1999:9),“the domestic environment refer
essentially to features, factors and forces…peculiar to the state,…foreign
policy is being made. The domestic environment includes geographical location of
the state, its peculiarity, natural and human resources, the nature of the
political system, quality of leadership, the nature of the interaction among
groups in the society etc (p.10).
Domestic
environmental factors have great impact on the decision/policy making of
a country. Little wonder, Northedge (1968:15) posits that the FP of any country
is a product of environmental factors both internal and external. The strength
of a particular domestic factor in influencing a particular foreign policy
option of a country however represents a complex calculus as evident in
Babaginda administration’s involvement of human and financial resources in
theLiberian Crises at a time when public opinion in Nigeria heavily tilted
against an involvement in the crises (Nwosu, 1993:17). As noted by Synder
(1962:5),
“…the number and complexity
of factors that influence national action in the international arena are not
only enormous, but the task of identifying the crucial variables is also
unfinished”.
Marston
(1968) on his part postulates that it is in the “home made” and aggregate of
all the external conditions and influences that affect the life and development
of organism, including also FP. Ogene (1998:68-81) and Kissinger (1969:503-05)
in their submissions examined the role of domestic structures in a country’s
relations with other nations in the world system. Modern diplomatic history has
portrayed the FP of a nation as one determined by its domestic structures
(Northedge 1968:20). Domestic environment as a matter of fact determines the
role a nation plays in the international system. Before the collapse of the
Soviet Union, USSR was a champion of communist policy, but today, the effect of
perestroika and glasnost has affected her role-playing in the international
arena. The DS plays a crucial role in the way actions ofother states are
interpreted. We cannot therefore consider the DS in isolation of
the international system since the technological achievement of any country has
a ready impact on other states (Nwosu,1993:17).
The next
sub sections shall consider the following factors: political
development,economy, the press, public opinion and pressure groups as been
central in the examination of the FP response of Nigeria towards Israel.
1.9.5 Political
Development
Nigeria’s
diplomatic ties with Israel had been in existence before her independence in
1960.Many contacts were facilitated in the late 1950s between Nigerian and
Israeli officials through joint participation in labour and socialist movement
meetings (Ojo 1986:436). Through these efforts, many Nigerian’s were encouraged
to visit Israel, and at a time Israel was aggressively galvanizing friendship
with the newly emergent Third World countries as to bridge the diplomatic gap
between her and the Third World (Curtis and Gitelson, 1976).
The
constitutional provisions of the Nigerian government allowed the regions of
thefederation to facilitate their own foreign policies, allow regional
delegations to be sent abroadto negotiate loans and other forms of assistance
for their regions as evident in a WesternRegional delegation led by its
Minister of Agriculture, Chief Akindeko, who visited Israel in1958 to observe
cooperative movements. The delegation negotiated cooperation agreementsin the
field of agriculture and cooperatives, the setting up of a number of joint
ventures withIsrael which facilitated the establishment in 1959, the Nigersoil
Construction Company andthe Nigerian Water Resources Development Corporation
(Ojo, 1986:437).
Counter
factually, the Northern Peoples Congress (NPC) in the first republicdominated
Nigeria’s domestic cum political environment (Nereus, 1993:19). The
Northernoligarchy displayed a disdained attitude towards Israel and preferred
external contact withMuslim countries, as shown in Sir Ahmadu Bello’s public
hostility and pronouncementstowards Israel. Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Chairman of
NPC, and the Premier of the formerNorthern Region is credited with the
following statement at the World Islamic League:
“It is also
fitting at this juncture for me to mention the numerous attempts made bythe
Jews to entice underdeveloped countries to their side. Barely two years
ago,they offered a sizable amount of loan to the Federation of Nigeria. The
offer wasaccepted by all the governments except we in the North who rejected it
outright. I made it vividly clear at the time that Northern Nigeria would
prefer to go withoutdevelopment rather than receiving an Israeli loan to aid.
We took this step only ingood faith as Muslims (Paden, 1986:541)”.
Sir Ahmadu
Bello himself had traced his lineage to Prophet Mohammed (Bello, 1962:239),and
as noted in the editorial of West African (1956:606), the receptiveness of the
Northernleadership to Arab pressure attracted allegations of Egyptians covert
support for NPC before1960. In spite of extreme policy of Mohammedanism adopted
by the Northern region, Federal Government in the first republic established
diplomatic ties with Israel. Such move must have been necessitated by the
adoption of non aligned policy favoured by the National Council forNigeria and
Cameroon (NCNC), the junior partner in the federal coalition. Alhaji
TafawaBalewa therefore had no other option than to establish formal diplomatic
relations with Israelwhen he reiterated that Nigeria would “remain on friendly
terms with every nation whichrecognizes and respects our sovereignty and… shall
not blindly follow the lead to anyone”(Balewa, 1964:56-7). Ojo (1986:437) is
therefore right in his persuasive submission thatNigeria might have adopted
“open door” diplomatic policy as the result of the need fornational unity and
economic development. Israel was therefore allowed to establish anembassy in
Lagos, but the hostility of the northern elite towards her to a greater extent
wasresponsible for a major constraint by the Federal Government’s policy
towards Israel byrefusing to open an embassy in Tel-Aviv in order to maintain
the balance.
The
Nigerian-Israeli relations equally suffered a great set back as a result of the
1966military coup d’etat (Adefila, 1979:635) and the subsequent civil war that
bedveiled thenation for about 30 months. Nigeria perceived a foul play towards
Israel for its allegedsympathetic role played by supporting the defunct
Republic of Biafra during the country’scivil war (Aluko, 1976:92). The bloody
coup against the first republic brought in GeneralAguyi Ironsi as the first
Military Head of State in Nigeria. Before he could settle down to dealwith
domestic let alone foreign issues, he was brutally murdered and his regime
overthrownvia a counter coup (Operation Massacre) that instituted Gowon
Administration. At theinception of Gowon’s regime, it was alleged that Israel
was covertly giving military trainingand ammunition to the Ibos (New Nigerian,
1966). Israeli mission in Lagos denied theallegations but throughout the war,
the suspicion remained and Israeli Foreign Minister, AbbaEban, confirmed after
the war that Israel had exerted herself to a large extent in providing aidto
former Biafra, that if a dozen or twenty had also extended the same gesture,
the case wouldhave been different (Aluko, 1976:50). The press in Nigeria was
furious and reacted angrily toEban’s statement.
General
Gowon showed his displeasure by protesting to the Israeli governmentthrough a
letter sent to its Ambassador in Lagos. Gowon however believed that Israeli aid
tothe defunct Biafra was less significant to that of France and for his regime
to single out Israelwould appear “selective” capable of causing “more
problematic internal cleavages” (Ojo,1986:440). On the other hand, Mathews
(1987:534) has argued that the Nigerian governmentengaged in a wild romance
with North Africa and Arabs in the Middle East due to theirmilitary assistance
during the civil war. Thus, in 1971, Nigeria joined the Arab-dominated
oilcartel- the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).
Nigeria-Israeli
relations suffered another setback due to the outbreak of the October1973
Middle East war as Gowon blamed Israel for the renewal of hostility. Despite
the factthat the first shots were fired by Egypt, the Nigerian Head of State
argued that the hostilitycould not have resurfaced if Israel had withdrawn from
Arab territories in accordance with the1967 United Nations Resolution (West
African 1973:1508). Yet, he never bowed to bothinternal and external pressures
to severe diplomatic ties (West African, 1973: 1545). Israelidefiance in the
Middle East, violating the ceasefire agreement and consolidating its presenceon
the West Bank of the Suez Canal, made Gowon to angrily accused Israel of breaking
“faithwith Nigeria” (Ojo 1986:440). General Gowon had no choice than to severe
ties with Israel asChairman of the Organization of the African Union (OAU).
After the
Gowon’s administration was overthrown by General Murtala Mohammed,subsequent
administrations in Nigeria have towed the pro-Arab FP in the
Arab-Israeliconflict. Despite the fact that the Obasanjo’s regime renounced the
use of terms like Zionismto categorize the Israeli political system, Major
General Shehu Musa Yar’Adua, the second incommand, declared in Saudi Arabia in
1979 that “our friends are the Arabs, we shall alwayssupport them” (Daily
Times, 1979). Obasanjo’s government could therefore not do much torestore
diplomatic relations Israel,-leaving the issue to be handled by second RepublicGovernment.
The leadership of Nigerian Peoples Party (NPP) and the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN)
favored the restoration of ties with Israel (Nigerian Forum 1983:740-45). The
NationalParty of Nigeria (NPN) leadership perceived as representing the
interest of the NorthernMuslims was unenthusiastic. The UPN and NPP with
dominant Christian root supported therestoration of Nigeria-Israeli relations.
However,
such debate was ongoing when the military ended the civil rule in 1983.
General
Mohammed Buhari regime was dominated by Muslim officers, and no
considerationwas shown to the issue of restoring diplomatic ties with Israel.
In a way to tell the world thatthe status quo would remain, the militarily
junta appointed Ibrahim Gambari as ForeignAffairs Minister. Gambari, known for
his outright criticism and condemnation of Israel policytowards the Middle East
before his appointment, aggressively opposed to such move toreestablish
relations with Israel. The government demonstrated a total commitment to
antiIsraelpolicy by suspending the Emir of Kano and the Ooni of Ife for their
visit to Israel. TheEmir of Kano was also removed as Chancellor of the
University of Nigeria, Nsukka (NigerianTribune, 1985).
Buhari
regime was overthrown via a coup d’etat that ushered in Babangidaadministration
on 27th August, 1985 condemning Buhari’s FP, and describing it as
retaliatoryand incoherent (Newswatch, 1985:19). In 1991, the then Nigerian
Foreign Minister, MajorGeneral Ike Nwachukwu admitted that “Africa could not
allow itself to be left out in thecurrent efforts to bring peace to the Middle
East and other parts of the world”. He also admitted that the restoration of
diplomatic ties with Israel was “aimed at getting Africa backinto the
mainstream of world politics” (African Concord, 1991:24). General Babangida on
hispart noted that Nigeria’s renewal of diplomatic relations was deliberately
designed for Nigeria by his administration “to remain relevant in the world
affairs”, noting “…we don’t want to beleft in an empty shell” (Nigerian
Tribune, 1992). He further reiterated the intention ofNigerian Government to be
part of the Middle East Peace Process, speculating that Nigeria would host one
of the peace meetings. Thus, the accounts between Nigerian government andtheir
Israeli counterparts opened, culminating into the decision for the
reestablishment ofdiplomatic ties (Nereus, 1993:21). The Foreign Minister made
it clear that “diplomacy thesedays is not based on things that divide people
but things that unite them (Nigerian Tribune,1992). It should however be noted
that Nigeria never sought for OAU consent beforerestoring diplomatic ties with
Israel.
1.9.6 Economy
At
independence, Nigeria depended basically on the export of agricultural produce
whichaccounted for about 61 percent of its foreign earnings. After the Nigerian
civil war, theeconomy experienced another economic face, with the development
of manufacturing sectorwith a corresponding dependence on foreign inputs like
capital, managerial skills andtechnology. This was followed by the oil boom and
petrodollar inflow which made Nigeria toembark on a flamboyant FP (Olaniyan,
1988:105-8). At the close of the 1970s, majority of
SSA’s were
deep in debt following the cumulative events of crushed primary
commodityprices, oil shocks, discredited statist policies and dysfunctional
military rule (Akokpari,1999:26). It is therefore not surprising when Nwakwo
(1984) argued that, since then, Nigeria has developed a monolithic oil economy
which has subjected the country to vagaries ofeconomic downturns. The major oil
glut in the world market accounted for a budget deficit of$2,899.3 million in
1982 as against a budget surplus of $1,796.3 million in 1974
thusinstitutionalizing poverty and turning the nation into a beggar status
(Nwakwo, 1984:41).
This
situation further deteriorated the economy which was dependent,
disarticulatedand peripherally integrated into the world capitalist economy.
The government in order toaddress these deficiencies adopted several economic
policies such as Nigerianisation andIndigenization (which created very
unconducive environment for foreign investors) as tobring the nation out of its
economic doldrums. The administration of Babangida sought toaddress these
galaxies of economic challenges by adopting several economic policies
likeStructural Adjustment Programme [SAP] (Babangida, 1985:238) and the “use of
economicdiplomacy to attract foreign investors” (Nereus, 1993:18). Nigeria had
been engaged inbilateral relations with Israel before 1960 in which there was
economic cooperation in theareas of agriculture, cooperatives, construction and
water resources etc, particularly, in theEastern and Western regions which were
pro Israeli.
In the
1990s, due to economic logjam and alarming withdrawals of foreign
investmentfrom the country in spite of the government’s adoption of new
economic diplomacy,Babangida administration viewed the restoration of
diplomatic relations with Israel as greatagendum to stimulate the national
economy so as to encourage American Jewish leaders inpromoting investment in
Nigeria. General Nwachukwu in his visit to Israel told hiscounterpart that:
“We know,
for instance that you have the command of financial institutions of theworld
through your kith and kin in several industrialized and highly developedeconomies
and we believe also that your influence can bring some meaningful investment to
support such development programs” (The Guardian 1991).
The
reluctance shown by Arab states to assist Nigeria and other African countries
out of theirserious economic problems left Nigeria with no other option than to
extend her friendship to a“former foe” due to Babangida regime’s eagerness to
improve the domestic economy. SinceMay, 1992, when Nigeria and Israel restored
diplomatic relations, they have exchangeeconomic delegations for the betterment
of the duo.
1.9.7 The
Press, Public Opinion and Pressure Groups
Nigeria has
maintained certain level of freedom of speech even during the military era.
Evenduring the Civil War, General Gowon often yielded to “severe press criticisms”
as earlierobtained during the democratic regime of Balewa (Chick, 1971:126-27).
Counter
factually, the press, pressure groups and different interest groups have
beenable to persuade the government and the direction of its policy. Claude
(1965:2) has alsoacknowledged that public opinion has always been a political
factor guiding a country’s FP.The Nigeria government especially has displayed
this sensitivity both in its perception andconduct of its FP. Due to the
Israel-South African ties in the 1970’s, Nigerian press was verycritical of
this relationship, and its denouncement frosted the ties between Nigeria and
Israel.However, there was no monolithic voice from the press as regards how
Nigeria shouldinteract with Israel. There were different views by the Nigerian
Press on the issue of MiddleEast crisis based on regional and religious
sponsors (Daily Express, 1978). According to theNew Nigerian, there was to be
total disregard of restoration of diplomatic relation with Israelbecause of
it’s role in the civil war, the need to support Egypt, and the fact that the
“Israelisthemselves have by their recent elections demonstrated their
preference for continuedoccupation by voting into power the extremist Lukud
Party”. In August 1991, followingGeneral Ike Nwachukwu’s visit to Israel, the
same New Nigerian, in its editorial columnadvised Babangida regime not to
consider the restoration of diplomatic ties with Israel.
The New
Nigerian’s view was supported by the Northern elites, who even sponsoredthe
distribution of pamphlets creating a negative impression about Israel and the
evils done byIsrael in the past to destabilize the Nigerian state. On the other
hand, Southern based pressand individuals clamoured for restoration of
diplomatic ties with Israel because some of thembelieved that will affect the
religious climate in Nigeria. The Nigerian Tribune, The Guardian,Newswatch,
NACCIMA, Nigeria/Israeli Association emphatically called for restoration
ofdiplomatic ties and when president Babangida announced the restoration of
diplomatic tieswith Israel, this was regarded as a triumph over the opposing
pro-Arab group who saw suchrestoration as unwise.
1.10 Methodology
1.10.1 Research
Design
This is a historical as well as a comparative
analysis which evaluates the decisions made in the field of foreign affairs
concerning a selected number of issues over a period of 1975-1979 and
1985-1993. It is a descriptive analysis of these issues evaluated in terms of
the relationship between words and actions. To accomplish this task, the study
will rely primarily on data collection techniques involving;
a) A careful study of Nigeria’s foreign policy by means
of documentation (library research) on primary sources.
b) Content analysis of research bulletins, speeches,
journals and newspapers.
1.10.2 Method
of Data Collection
The source
used in the collection of data in this work is the secondary data, whereby
updates and information about this study were gotten from various textbooks,
journals, magazines, newspapers, bulletin, internet, directions and other
publications and documents both from private and government.
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